SwypikBuilt in EuropeInvestors
SwypikOS · our own operating system

AI proposes.
The machine decides.

SwypikOS is an operating system — not an app you install on top of someone else’s. It owns machine authority: the kernel, capabilities, leases, recovery, devices, drivers and the desktop itself, with Ilaria built in as a cognitive provider, never an authority source. Our first-party kernel seed boots via UEFI in QEMU (emulation only); the desktop, agent and search are built and tested natively.

Own kernel
first-party kernel seed (QEMU-validated) — no copied kernel code
F8 / F9
every agent step shown and approved
Hardware sandboxing
strict capability-gated isolation
Deterministic
cryptographically verified system integrity
SwypikOSLocal desktop
Workspace/Home

One machine. Your rules.

Your desktop, with Ilaria.

Six native tabs. Every action visible, every effect approved.

Try “open search”, “agent” or “compute” — this replica runs entirely in your browser.

Interactive replica of the SwypikOS desktop, rebuilt for the web. Click a tab, approve a step with F8, or search with and without diacritics. Content is illustrative.

Status, labelled

Three tracks. One authority model.

What runs today, what we are proving and what we are designing — kept apart on purpose, and labelled on every surface.

Core · first-party kernel seed

The SwypikOS kernel

A proprietary, freestanding kernel seed. It boots from UEFI and is validated in QEMU emulation; the final base architecture is still an open decision.

  • Capability-gated user-mode driver domains
  • Strict memory isolation & NX by default
  • IOMMU DMA isolation (validated in QEMU)
Proprietary kernel architecture · internal testing
Built · desktop & agent

The SwypikOS desktop

Its own UI engine and native rendering — no browser engine inside — with Ilaria’s approval-gated agent, its own search engine and files. Built and tested natively while the kernel matures.

  • Home, Chat, Agent, Search, Files, Compute, Settings
  • DPI-aware rendering, IME, paste and history
  • Strict isolation: zero browser children, zero background listeners
Internal builds · private intellectual property
Architecture · reference environment

Reference platform

A hardware-isolated reference environment running framebuffer UI, capability security, and verified sandboxing.

  • F8 consent before a goal is sent to Ilaria
  • No ambient root or arbitrary execution tools
  • Durable checkpointing and recovery
Reference environment · capability-verified
Native, all the way down

No Electron. No Chromium. No WebView.

From the kernel to the pixels, SwypikOS is code we own: a first-party kernel, our own UI engine and native rendering. No Node, no HTTP UI server, no browser hiding inside the desktop — nothing between the machine and the code we wrote.

Not insideElectronChromiumWebViewNodeHTTP UI server
What it isOwn kernelOwn UI engineNative renderingGo · Systems code

Every step shown. Every step yours.

Ilaria plans one step at a time. F8 approves, F9 denies — and a prompt must be visible for 500 ms first. Edits need the file hash from a prior read, so stale content is never overwritten. Runs are checkpointed and survive restarts.

Its own search engine.

High-performance ranking, full diacritic normalization, prefix matching and contextual snippets. Sites are crawled only after explicit confirmation, honouring robots.txt and blocking private addresses. Zero dependence on third-party search APIs.

Honest by construction.

Chat talks to the Ilaria service you configure. No service, no answer: errors are shown, never simulated. The desktop never loads weights or starts servers behind your back.

Consent before compute.

The Compute tab detects NVIDIA GPUs and records your consent for future Ilaria training contribution. Off by default, and it says plainly that no work is running yet.

In current desktop previews, approved actions run under process-lifecycle control with user consent. Hardware capability isolation is the job of the SwypikOS kernel seed, which today runs in QEMU emulation only.

Core · First-party kernel seed (QEMU-validated)

A kernel we wrote ourselves.

Not a Linux fork. A proprietary, freestanding kernel seed, validated in QEMU, that takes the machine from UEFI firmware into its own isolated execution domains — and treats every device as something a driver must be granted, never assumed.

  • 01
    Secure platform handover

    Direct UEFI initialization taking complete control of system memory and execution contexts.

  • 02
    Multi-level page isolation

    Hardware-enforced non-executable memory, isolated address spaces, and transactional mapping rollback.

  • 03
    Least-privilege rings

    User-mode initialization and driver execution at unprivileged levels with zero implicit device permissions.

  • 04
    Cryptographic capabilities

    Opaque, generation-protected security handles bound to explicit domains and lease fences.

  • 05
    Brokered device access

    Every MMIO, IRQ, DMA, and bus configuration access is strictly validated on each request.

  • 06
    IOMMU DMA isolation

    DMA remapping that limits peripheral access to kernel and user memory (validated in QEMU).

  • 07
    Timer-driven preemption

    Hardware timer scheduling designed for predictable latency and responsiveness (validated in QEMU).

  • 08
    Fault containment

    Isolated failure domains designed to keep driver or task crashes away from the core operating system (validated in QEMU).

  • 09
    Topology verification

    Cryptographically verified hardware topology safeguarding against hardware spoofing and probing.

serial0 · swypik microkernel · x86_64
swypik-boot --efi BOOTX64.EFI --secure --verify-hardware
UEFI Secure Handover · Memory Attestation · Capability Engine
SwypikOS native microkernel
stage=uefi-handover arch=x86_64
handoff=kernel boot-services=exiting
post-ExitBootServices · System Integrity Handshake
[ ok ]EXITED_BOOT_SERVICESmemory map secured · firmware handoff complete
[ ok ]PAGE_ALLOCATOR_READYisolated memory pools · hardware guard pages
[ ok ]KERNEL_ROOT_ACTIVEhardware page tables · address space isolated
[ ok ]DIRECT_MAP_READYhigher-half protected memory mapping
[ ok ]PRIVILEGE_READYstrict ring separation · user-space isolation
[ ok ]SECURITY_ABI_READYhardware exception filters & gates
[ ok ]PLATFORM_READYhardware timer & power interfaces online
[ ok ]SCHEDULER_READYdeterministic scheduling · 1 ms quantum
[ ok ]DRIVER_ABI_READYcapability table · driver domains · device broker
[ ok ]IOMMU_GUARD_READYhardware DMA protection enabled (fail-closed)
→ swyp_kernel_runtime_active
init service · capability sandbox · zero implicit device grants
[ ok ]domain-isolationunprivileged execution · verified sandbox
[ ok ]fault-containmentisolated fault stopped & recovered cleanly
[ ok ]resource-meteringquantum enforcement & execution limits active
[PASS]SECURITY AUDIT: ALL INTEGRITY CHECKS PASShardware sandboxing verified
swypik-verify --attest
sha256 42a0732c0befc0021c6c5b084e481676d2e36406fc5672f5d23bb0c0ca15014ecryptographic seal ✓
Live attestation replay: microkernel initialization and capability validation sequence.
Capability model

How a driver touches hardware.

Every request is revalidated by the device broker — domain, lease fence, handle generation, rights and object type — before any backend runs. Revoked handles fail forever.

Ring 3

Driver domain

Isolated address space · non-executable memory · zero ambient authority

handle0x0007·0042gen 7
request: MMIO map
Ring 0 · privileged gate

Device broker

Revalidates every call before any backend runs

  • domain
  • lease fence
  • handle generation
  • rights mask
  • object type
Hardware operations

Brokered backends

  • MMIOnon-executable user device mapping
  • IRQInterrupt routing: mediated & bounded
  • DMADMA capability + shared memory + IOMMU
  • ConfigBus configuration: bounded access
Teardown, in this order
  1. Quiesce domain
  2. Clean backend state
  3. Revoke capabilities
  4. Old handles fail by generation

Generation counters never wrap back to a stale handle — an exhausted slot is retired.

Control Kernel

Invariants are code, not slideware.

The Control Kernel and Resource Governor enforce formal security invariants — governing machine authority, capability grants, and cross-boundary protocol integrity.

  1. 1
    executor identity is authenticated and security-bound

    Every effect executor proves who it is against a live Control Kernel lease. A stale fence or a forged identity cannot act.

  2. 2
    side effects require explicit capabilities

    There is no ambient authority. A plan names what it needs; SwypikOS mints exact, scoped grants — or refuses.

  3. 3
    uncertain effects are never blindly replayed

    If an outcome was never recorded, recovery escalates to an operator instead of guessing and running it twice.

Formal Policy Enforcement Active Protocol Guard
Rule 01

Authenticated Executor

Cryptographic identity verification against active kernel lease before effect dispatch.

Rule 02

Zero Ambient Authority

All IO, memory, and hardware access require explicit, revocable, scoped capabilities.

Rule 03

Deterministic Postconditions

State transitions verify postconditions and abort on any divergence or unexpected fault.

Rule 04

Fault Containment

Subsystem or driver panic is contained in user-mode domains without affecting kernel core.

ResourceGovernorforeground responsiveness has priority over background workdisabled compute performs no synthetic workbackground worker count is bounded
Driver synthesis · M1 contract

AI may write the driver. It never approves it.

“Model confidence is never an authorization signal.”

Driver synthesis security contract
  1. 01SynthesizeIlaria drafts source, capability request and tests — as untrusted input.
  2. 02Isolated buildTrusted builder. Artifact bytes are re-hashed against the manifest.
  3. 03Deterministic verifyABI, hardware binding, capability vocabulary, exact hashes. No model call.
  4. 04StageRequires an Ed25519 verifier attestation bound to this exact candidate.
  5. 05CanaryRuns in an isolated user-mode driver domain with brokered capabilities.
  6. 06Health gateExplicit canary health evidence. A regression records a reason.
  7. ActivateACTIVE · hash-chained journalRollbackROLLBACK → SAFE_MODE if unrecoverable

Every transition is journaled. A partially persisted transition is never assumed to have succeeded.

User-mode driver domains by defaultNo ambient kernel memory, filesystem or networkNever brakes, steering, airbags or propulsionRaw hardware serials excluded

M1 verifies the portable contracts and a simulated unknown-device lifecycle. Real hardware rollout additionally requires controlled physical probes, signing and attestation policy, qualified hardware matrices and recovery testing.

Design stage · Compute Fabric

Idle compute, by explicit consent.

People who install SwypikOS will be able to contribute idle GPU, CPU or NPU capacity to Ilaria training — a strategic compute plane, not a crypto, mining or reward feature.

  • Explicit consentOff by default. Shows what runs, when and what data moves. Revocation stops work at once.
  • Idle & AC power onlyBelow a temperature limit, outside your hours; yields the moment you return.
  • Signed bundles, sandboxedWorkers have no implicit user-data capability: no home, no personal memory, no secrets.
  • Untrusted resultsReplication, spot checks and robust aggregation. Candidates never directly mutate production weights.
Your deviceidle · on AC · below thermal limit
Sandboxed workerno user files · no personal memory · no secrets
Verifierreplication · spot checks · robust aggregation
Next Ilaria checkpointcandidates never directly mutate production weights
In the desktop todayGPU detectionConsent storedNo work runs yet
Vision · North Star

One architecture for every device class.

The long-term direction: a first-party OS whose installer contains Ilaria — probing the hardware, then synthesizing, verifying, canarying and remembering support under explicit capability boundaries.

Desktop & laptopFull OS target
Phone & tabletARM64-first · unlockable reference devices
Embedded & edgeBSP + DeviceTree + isolated drivers
AutomotiveInfotainment & compute only — never safety-critical control
Robots & appliancesDevice-class-specific safety policy
Target architectures
  • x86-64UEFI microkernel boots cleanly
  • ARM64Contract layouts compile
  • RISC-V 64Contract layouts compile
The installer contains Ilaria
  1. Probe hardware
  2. Build DeviceGraph
  3. Match signed drivers
  4. Synthesize if unknown
  5. Verify
  6. Canary
  7. Activate or roll back

Ilaria may write code. It never gets unrestricted kernel authority.

“Universal” means one architecture, contract set and toolchain across devices — not a claim that every locked or proprietary device can be installed on without vendor permission or technical access.

Read this before the pitch deck

What we don’t claim yet.

Ambition is only credible next to an honest boundary. These limits come straight from our own engineering records.

  • SwypikOS is not yet a shipping, general-purpose OS for everyday use.
  • The microkernel is in active development; general peripheral driver stacks are roadmap targets.
  • Physical hardware validation is progressive: initial testing conducted in isolated environments.
  • IOMMU protection is verified per-target before any driver DMA is authorized.
  • No universal hardware or driver support; generated drivers do not run outside controlled tests.
  • The Compute Fabric runs no work and pays no rewards.
  • Evaluation builds run in isolated test configurations: general installers are roadmap targets.
  • No RAM-footprint or startup-time figures until a documented release benchmark reproduces them.
  • The production kernel base remains an evidence-gated decision, benchmarked against verified standards.

Try “open movies”, “open go”, “stiri” or “investors”.